With over 3 billion users globally, mobile instant messaging apps have become indispensable for both personal and professional communication. Besides plain messaging, many services implement additional features such as delivery and read receipts informing a user when a message has successfully reached its target. This paper highlights that delivery receipts can pose significant privacy risks to users. We use specifically crafted messages that trigger delivery receipts allowing any user to be pinged without their knowledge or consent. By using this technique at high frequency, we demonstrate how an attacker could extract private information such as the online and activity status of a victim, e.g., screen on/off. Moreover, we can infer the number of currently active user devices and their operating system, as well as launch resource exhaustion attacks, such as draining a user's battery or data allowance, all without generating any notification on the target side. Due to the widespread adoption of vulnerable messengers (WhatsApp and Signal) and the fact that any user can be targeted simply by knowing their phone number, we argue for a design change to address this issue.
But you can turn off sealed sender messages from anyone, so they’d have to already be a trusted contact
The setting to mitigate this attack (so that only people who know your username can do it, instead of anybody who knows your number) is called Who Can Find Me By Number. According to the docs, setting it to nobody requires also setting Who Can See My Number to nobody. Those two settings are both entirely unrelated to Signal’s “sealed sender” thing, which incidentally is itself cryptography theater, btw.
But you can turn off sealed sender messages from anyone, so they’d have to already be a trusted contact
The setting to mitigate this attack (so that only people who know your username can do it, instead of anybody who knows your number) is called Who Can Find Me By Number. According to the docs, setting it to nobody requires also setting Who Can See My Number to nobody. Those two settings are both entirely unrelated to Signal’s “sealed sender” thing, which incidentally is itself cryptography theater, btw.